Rapid Growth of the Thai Economy
Agrarian and Environmental Change
Change and Poverty
Future Directions

The flowing of the never-falling rivers, the fall of the periodical rains, the fervor of the tropical sun, the richness of the soil, all invite the cares of the cultivator, and would bring the recompense of abundant harvests. -- Sir John Bowring, 1857

Introduction

During the years when other undeveloped countries of the world were being colonized by the developed nations of the West, Thailand studiously avoided all contact with Western powers. Both diplomatic and commercial relationships were shunned until the arrival of Sir John Bowring in 1855.

At the time of his arrival, the economy of Thailand was based on the cultivation of rice almost entirely for subsistence consumption or local barter. There was a limited commercial sector which supplied the royal court and the city of Bangkok at that time. Trade links, however, were few and even villages close to Bangkok were enclosed and made up of self-sufficient communities. (Sharp and Hanks, 1978)

Sir John Bowring’s visit resulted in the signing of the Bowring Treaty between England and Thailand in April 1855 which removed all restrictions on trade with the West and was followed by similar treaties with other Western nations. The consequence, the commercialization of the rice sector of Thailand, was the major economic change to impact Thailand from 1855 until the early 1950s (Rigg, 1987)

I. The Rapid Growth of the Thai Economy

Over the past 40 years, as the international market economy and trade has increased its impact on the country, Thailand has been transformed from one of the poorest countries of the world (in 1950 Thailand had completed a century of zero per capita output growth) into one of the world’s fastest growing economies today (an average growth rate of 8% over the past decade). (see appendix 2) Thailand is currently referred to as one of Asia’s "New Little Dragons" and is on the verge of joining the exclusive club of N.E. Asian NICs. (Warr, 1993)

The rapid economic growth which Thailand has experienced during the past four decades, however, has been focused largely on the greater Bangkok area and has benefited mainly the top 10-20% of the population, most of whom live in or around Bangkok. Whereas the income share of the top 10% of the population grew from 49.8% in 1962 to 54.98% in 1989, the share of the bottom 10% of the population actually decreased from 2.43% in 1975 to 1.76% in 1989. (Teerana, 1990 & Warr, 1993) (see appendix 3 & 4) The high distortion of income distribution can be seen most clearly as it affects Northeast Thailand as compared to Thailand’s primate city, Bangkok. As has been noted by one study, "whereas the Bangkok Metropolitan Region contained 15.8% of the population in 1988, per capita GDP in Bangkok was 9 times higher than that for the Northeast, which accounts for over 33% of the total population of Thailand" (Chalongphob, 1992, 30) (see appendix 5)

It is generally felt that the rapid economic growth of Thailand has resulted in the decline of the incidence of poverty in the country. When, however, the upward adjustment of the standard of living in the nation is taken into account, the poverty level in Thailand today, at best, is no better than it was 20 years ago. At worst, the poverty level has increased. (Christensen, 1993 , see appendix 6) The increase in the percent of the Northeastern Thai population living below the poverty line had actually increased from 35.93% in 1981 to 67.10% in 1988. (Krongkaew, 1992)

It seems that a decade of "breakneck economic development has created two Thailands: an affluent and industrialized capital city and an impoverished agricultural hinterland." (FEER, April 14, 1994,22) On the one hand, Thailand’s rapid growth has been an unbalanced growth which has strongly favored industry over agriculture. Agriculture seems to have been relegated to a position of non importance in Thailand’s drive toward export-led industrial growth. As one agricultural economist in Thailand has noted, "to the government, agriculture does not even have the status of the son of a minor wife. It is the child of the maid." (FEER, 29, April, 1993, 48) On the other hand, rapid growth has extracted a high environmental cost. Natural resource depletion, deforestation, soil erosion and general environmental degradation has resulted in large measure from the urban and industrial biased development efforts of the government begun with the first National Economic Development Plan in 1961.(Krongkaew, 1992)(Brookfield & Byron, 1993: 363-364)

It is the condition of rapid economic growth coupled with the growth of absolute and relative poverty, and growing environmental degradation, especially in Northeast Thailand, which gives rise to the issue addressed by this paper. That issue is, the nature and causes of agrarian and environmental change in Northeastern Thailand and its relationship to the growth of poverty and inequity in the Northeast during the 1950-1990 period.

II. Agrarian and Environmental Change in Northeast Thailand 1950s - 1990s

At the time of Bowring’s incursion into Thailand, the whole country retained a frontier character. Northeast Thailand, the last of the frontier areas, was not penetrated by the central Thai government until the last half of the nineteenth century. At that time the Northeast (one third of Thailand’s land area) was heavily forested and sparsely settled. Since that time, however, social, economic, political, cultural and institutional changes have impacted and basically altered the human-environment balance which had prevailed in the Northeast prior to the invasion of the central government and the lowland Thai. (Hafner, 1990)

A. Northeast Thailand: a marginalized periphery

In their important book, Land Degradation and Society, Blaikie and Brookf ield define the concept of margin or marginality from three perspectives: neo-classical economics, ecology and political economy.(Blaikie and Brookf ield, 1987, 19-23) A fourth perspective, that of spatial marginalization, is necessary when discussing the marginality of Northeast Thailand.

1. A marginal environment

Northeastern Thailand is very definitely a marginalized environment. The physical environment of the Northeast can be considered marginal in a number of ways. A third of the land area of the Northeast is unsuitable for successful cultivation. Less than a third has been used traditionally for rice cropping with very poor results (the region’s soil is considered to be the poorest in Southeast Asia). The remainder of the land is suitable for limited upland cropping. (Parnwell, 1988).

One of the major constraints of the area is its climate. Although the region has an annual rainfall of from 1200-1400 mm, the distribution is poor. Most of the rain occurs from May - October and can fall heavily during certain periods and not at all during others leading to both flooding and drought conditions in the same year. (Polthanee, 1986)

Soil quality is another important constraint. The soil of the area is sandy in nature with a low water holding capacity. There is low organic matter content in the soil which results in poor fertility. There are high levels of salinity throughout the region with enormous salt deposits in at least two areas, the Korat and Sakon Nakhon basins. (Puntasen,1994)

There are two rivers which drain the region, both of which have two characteristics which seriously limit their usefulness for agricultural purposes. Both the Mun and the Chii rivers have few tributaries which means that vast tracts of land are beyond their reach. Both rivers cut deeply into the soft sandstone structures that underlie the region. The water level is generally ten to twenty meters below the level of the rice fields except in full flood conditions. (Ng, 1978)

2. A marginal economy

As the population of the Northeast has grown, land access has depended on the process of "extensification". Since the late 1980s there has been a scarcity of land due partially to the extensification process reaching its limits and in part to government pressure to evict poor settlers from degraded forest areas in the Northeast. As the limits of extensification were reached, poor farmers experienced the law of diminishing returns as the land became poorer in quality as the extensification process went on. Intensification was not feasible, as the farmers lacked the resources (credit and inputs to the agricultural system) to do intensive farming. An added constraint was the capricious nature of the environment which made it impossible to risk using HYV crops which demand a stable environment and high cost inputs. For the main part, the farmers of the Northeast have remained with traditionally appropriate varieties of rice which are drought and flood resistant and can be harvested in a shorter period of time. This, however, has meant that the economic gain is very low and barely covers the cost of production at times. For the Northeastern farmer, however, survival is the basic concern and so the path of least risk is taken.

3. A marginal political-economic setting

The Northeast is on the edge of the political and economic mainstream of Thailand. It is the last of the real frontiers in the country and has been considered an "exotic", strange and "foreign" area by the majority of Thai people. (Thongchai Winitchakul, 1994 private discussion).

Due to the centralization of power and development in the Bangkok Metropolitan area, the Northeast has traditionally been the most "powerless" and least developed area of the country. Today, even with the advent of and emphasis on decentralization, the same can be said. The entire area and its population has been excluded from decision making and employment opportunities (with the exception of migration to Bangkok or external countries for work). The normal process has been for the core (Bangkok) to channel capital, raw materials, food stuff, and labor from the Northeast to Bangkok which is the primary focal point of growth in the country. As a result, the Northeast has been relegated to stagnation and underdevelopment.

4. Spatial marginality

A common saying in Northeast Thailand is that "raow yoo klai chak kwam charoen" - "we are very far from progress". Although the Bowring Treaty initiated a process of "territorialization" on the part of the central government (Bangkok), that very process, although extending the control of Bangkok over the Northeast, has created the very exploitation which is largely responsible for the pervading sense of spatial marginalization. (Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995)

B. Forces contributing to agrarian and environmental change

1. Rain-fed rice farming: core of N.E. agriculture 1950s - 1990s

The rapid commercialization of the Thai economy is generally attributed to the expansion of rice production following the Bowring Treaty of 1855. Even in the Northeast, there were increases in production of rice and shipment of paddy to Bangkok, especially after the introduction of the rail road line in the early part of this century. (Hafner, 1990, "Forces":76).

In spite of this fact, the bulk of the Northeast remained isolated from the rest of Thailand up until the 1950s and 1960s and was populated by subsistence farmers who lived by planting glutinous wet rice and had little knowledge of the rest of the country. (Rigg, 1986) Although the Northeast has over 40% of all agricultural land in Thailand and although approximately one third of that land is given over to rice cultivation, the production methods and technology of rice cultivation has remained basically unchanged from the 1950s - 1990s. (Rigg, 1986)

Thailand as a whole has not undergone an even modest Green Revolution, and as a result has one of the lowest rates of productivity (area yield) in the world. In the Northeast, irrigated land accounts for less than 10% of the area planted to paddy. Less than 10% of rice land is planted in High Yielding Varieties and chemical fertilizers are applied on an average of 28.75 kilos per hectare (the lowest ratio in Southeast Asia). In short, rice production in the Northeast has either remained at the same level of production or in some cases has fallen below the average as new marginal lands have been brought into production. (Turton, 1989) (Rigg, 1986)

Although the Northeast continues to be the largest producer of glutinous rice in Thailand (one third of all paddy land in Thailand is given over to glutinous rice and all most all of that is in the Northeast) it continues to produce sub-standard yields. (Turton, 1989) This is mainly the result of the marginal climate which prevails in the area. In response to the capricious nature of rainfall patterns, the farmers of the Northeast have evolved a flexible cultivation strategy both socially and agronomically. The focus of the strategy is not to maximize yields, but rather to ensure survival and stability of production year to year. There is one requirement which is fundamental to this strategy: traditional rice varieties which have a large degree of ecological flexibility are used. These varieties must be able to deal with a varying water supply and the particular conditions found on each plot. (Rigg, 1987)

Thus, Boserup’s seminal work on the effects of population growth on the development of agrarian change seem to have little relevance to the static nature of a large part of the agricultural scene (rice cultivation) in Northeast Thailand. As Rigg notes, "there is strong evidence to indicate that the marginal environment of the area was seriously limiting the scope for innovation ... This shows the folly of ignoring the role of the environment, as Boserup did, in restricting innovation." (Rigg, 1987: 43) It should be added that another factor which impacted the situation was the serious limitations of resources on the part of the Northeastern farmers.

2. From "subsistence" to "cash economy" 1950s - 1990s

Bernstein has noted that the crucial moment in the penetration of a natural economy by capital is the breaking of its cycle of reproduction by the monetization of at least some of its elements. (Bernstein, 1992:162) This was the condition which the Northeast faced starting in the early 1950s. In a sense, it is interesting that although capitalism and its ideology and culture penetrated Thai society during the latter half of the nineteenth century, it had little impact on the Northeast until the middle of the twentieth century. One explanation is that the strong sakdina ideology (feudalism, for want of a better term) which permeated Thai society (and still does, some would say, in the form of patrimonialism) ( Jacobs, 1971) acted as a barrier to the pervasive penetration of capitalism until the early 1950s. (Nartsupha, 1984)

But between 1950 and 1984 the share of cultivated land under paddy declined from 96% to 73%. At the same time the total number of holdings in the Northeast increased by over 36% and the total area of holdings by 53%. These shifts were the direct result of a dramatic growth in upland cash crops in the Northeast. Three crops constituted the core of the cash crops which were introduced at that time: corn, kenaf, cassava. (Hafner, 1990, "Forces") Rigg calls this occurrence the "second, less well-documented ‘revolution’ in Thai agriculture", and states that "it has been most dramatic in the more remote areas and especially in the Northeast" where "the inhabitants were isolated from a market economy until after the end of the Second World War." (Rigg, 1987: 370)

Rigg, elsewhere, notes that the expansion of cash cropping in the Northeast was due, in part, to the government’s "provision of an efficient road system" which "brought farmers into contact with the market economy of Thailand and gave them the desire and the ability to cultivate crops for cash." (Rigg, 1986, "Chinese": 73) He also notes that "private capital" in the form of Chinese "middlemen" were the initiators of the penetration of the market economy into the Northeast. Not only did these merchants provide markets and supplies to the farmers of the Northeast, but they also supplied credit and knowledge which was necessary for the change from traditional rice cropping to cash cropping. (Rigg, 1986, "Chinese" :77).

While, on the one hand, the role of private capitalists in bringing a commercialized, market economy to the Northeast can not be denied, neither, on the other hand, can the role of the State be excluded from that process. Rigg himself notes that "from the late 1950s the Thai government began to implement programmes and policies designed to develop the Northeast and strengthen its presence there." (Rigg, 1986, "Innovation": 32) The result was investment by the government in the development of infrastructure for a modern economy which led to a tremendous expansion in communications within the Northeast and between the Northeast and Bangkok. Riggs states, "for the first time, they (Northeasterners) were in contact with the market economy of the Central Plains (Bangkok)." He further notes that "the roads brought ‘civilization’, or at least its universal substitute, money." (Rigg, 1986, "Innovation":32)

The cultivation of cash crops did not impinge on the traditional rice lands as cash crops were grown in the highly infertile soils of the uplands. These areas had been used traditionally for grazing, shifting agriculture and the collection of forest products. The development of cash cropping, according to Rigg, can thus be seen as a true innovation and one of the most significant developments to have impacted agriculture in the region during this century. (Rigg, 1986, "Innovation")

The process, however, did not end there. In 1961, the Thai government began what was called the First National Economic Development Plan. Under the influence of the World Bank and its development strategy, the government began a series of successive policies (at this time Thailand is in the middle of the seventh National Economic Development Plan) which have neglected and/or discriminated against the agricultural sector and rural communities and have favored urban and industrial development in the Central Plains (Bangkok). (Turton, 1989)

In 1955, the government gave the poor farmers of the Northeast added incentive to make the transition to cash cropping by instituting a "rice premium" which effectively put a 40% FOB price tax on exported rice. Translated to the level of the rice farmer, it came to "a tax of slightly more than 80% at the farm" (Rigg, 1987:376) Silcock has noted that, "the operation of the rice premium as a combined tax and subsidy represents a very substantial inducement to Thai farmers to switch from rice to other crops and other occupations outside agriculture." (Silcock, 1967:244)

Rigg notes that the "effect of commercialization associated with the ‘intrusion’ of the cash economy into rural areas of Thailand...has widened and intensified the ‘pressure of needs’ in the country." (Rigg, 1993: 280) Referring especially to the Northeast, he states that "there is a growing requirement that each household have a cash income...the intrusion of the cash economy into the rural communities of Thailand has created a demand for goods and services which before the Second World War barely existed...this requires that farmers produce not only for subsistence, but also for sale. It is easy to underestimate the influence of these newly found ‘needs’ (but) it has become an integral, if subsidiary, part of the total pressure of needs on resources, and with time the pressure is likely to grow." (Rigg, 1986, "Innovation":34,35)

At the same time as the "pressure" of these needs were impacting poor farmers, policies enacted by the Thai government to benefit what has been called the "tripod structure" of dominant capital in Thailand (state, local power’s capital, and foreign capital) acted against the interests of the small holders. As Turton observes, there are inequitable distributional consequences of government policies which favor the better-off producers and benefit large agribusinesses. By the government’s regulation of the rice exports, maintenance of government revenue from rice taxes, and maintenance of low-priced rice for domestic consumption, the "paddy farmers are squeezed on the one hand...and on the other hand ... are disadvantaged by industrial and trade policies which tax agriculture by increasing the price of production inputs and consumer goods." (Turton, 1989: 62) The ultimate effect of this reproductive squeeze is to force farmers out to marginalized uplands where the cultivation of upland cash crops is most effective.

Hafner sums up the effect of the commercialization of the Northeast through "cash cropping" by noting that "expanded cash cropping in the Northeast is at once a result of market and price incentives and a cause of increasing degradation and deforestation of forest lands." (Hafner, 1990: 79)(see appendix 7 & 8) The spread of cash cropping in the Northeast has had a significant effect on the depletion of forests in the area. Cash crops do well on the marginal soils and poor conditions of the upland areas and do not compete with the traditional paddy crop for land.

3. Deforestation and development 1950s - 1990s

Lohmann notes that "to a degree unseen prior to the last few decades, villagers have been both pushed of f land in long-settled areas and encouraged to take up new and destructive roles in frontier society." (Lohmann, 1993: 181) Several factors have contributed to this pressure on local villagers to colonize forests. The first was the many mutually beneficial deals that Thai elites made with foreign commercial and military powers following the 1855 trade treaty with England. Another has been the mutually beneficial State-foreign alliances which began just after the Second World War. Foreign loans and aid packages were used to develop infrastructure throughout the country which led to the deprivation of villagers of their control over local resources and also created a strong "pull" on villagers to clear forest areas. As infrastructure was developed, access to formerly inaccessible resources was provided and the government, influenced by Thailand’s elite, granted commercial concessions to these areas which further marginalized local villagers. The World Bank’s promotion of the integration of Thailand’s agricultural sector into the international economic system was an added pressure as "cash cropping" pulled local farmers into previously uncultivated areas of forest reserves. This process has generally taken the Thai social form of "patron-client" relations or networks in which the patrons, Thai elites (powerful merchants, millers and traders), have provided marketing and resources for clearing the forests of the Northeast for resource extraction as well as cash cropping and the clients, the villagers, have provided the labor. (Lohmann, 1993)

Another pressure on the local villagers of the Northeast has been the "deprivation" of natural resources which had originally been theirs to control and manage. The transformation of what had formerly been a "commons" managed and controlled by villagers, into a scarce national resource to be competed over, has prompted a "rational" response from villagers who say, as Shalardchai notes, "Why not cut down the tree ourselves, when those nai toons (capitalists) from town will definitely come to cut them down anyway’ (Shalardchai, 1989) As Hirsch notes, "in the Northeast ... poor villagers are finding that they are being challenged by the more powerful forces of government and industry for the use of previously unclaimed frontier or ‘waste’ forest land that in former times had served as a guarantee and a safety valve in times of economic or political difficulty." (Hirsch & Lohmann, 1989: 440)

This triad of political economic interests in the forests lands of the Northeast has resulted in recent confrontations between local villagers and the government which have been referred to as "The Land Wars" by some. ( FEER, 31 October, 1991). Philip Hirsch depicts this ongoing competition (see appendix 9) between the three forces interested in the forest lands of the Northeast and notes that the survival of the forests depends on the "involvement of local people " in setting up programs of rehabilitation and the prevention of further encroachment. He also notes, however, that only with "achievement of a substantial degree of power vis-à-vis both the state and capital will the marginalized occupants of Thailand’s forest reserve land have the resources and incentive to participate in a long-term approach to ecologically viable development of these fragile lands." (Hirsch, 1990:173)

Rigg summarizes the changing resource realities in Thailand during the period 1950s - 1990s by noting that during this period, "population has grown, commercialization has raised needs, and land has become a commodity in short supply. As a result, farmers’ use of the forest has had to change. However, farmers have witnessed the intrusion of new actors onto the scene. In particular, the government and commercial forestry interests have imposed their own needs and demands. In some cases these have been complimentary to those of the farmers, but more often than not they have been in conflict." (Rigg, 1993:288)

From the Northeast farmers’ perspective, the agrarian and environmental changes that have taken place over the past four decades during the period of the most rapid development of Thailand’s economy are anything but "progressive". Land is scarce, resources are expensive, forests are diminished, degraded, protected and alienated and poverty is on the rise.

III. Agrarian and Environmental Change and Poverty

As has been noted above, there is a growing incidence of poverty and inequity in Northeast Thailand. The question is what is the relationship between the growing poverty and inequity in the region and the agrarian change and environmental degradation which has taken place over the past four decades.

A. The Traditional View

The conventional literature on the relationship between poverty and the environment tends to present a deterministic view of the relationship focusing on the negative impact of the poor on the environment. This issue is also at the core of the field of environment and development which was initiated by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. Chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, the commission produced a report commonly referred to as the Brundtland Report.

Broad (Broad, 1994) presents three sets of assumed correlations between the poor and the environment which are posited by the conventional view. The first of these three assumed correlations was put forth in the Brundtland Report which saw poverty as "a major cause and effect of global environmental problems." (World Commission, 1987: 3) The poor are agents as well as victims of environmental degradation. Secondly, the report defined sustainable development as "that which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." (World Commission, 1987: 8) The poor are seen as "short-term maximizers" and therefore have no ability to consider the future. The report notes that the poor "have a small margin for curbing or foregoing present consumption in order to avoid damaging or depleting the natural resources on which they depend for survival." (World Commission, 1987: 4) The poor are locked into a "downward spiral" of environmental degradation which leads them to "increased poverty forcing them to further degrade the environment" (Broad, 1994:812) Third, the conventional view focuses on a dichotomy of non-environmentalism and the poor versus environmentalism and the rich. According to this oppositional logic, if environmental degradation is caused by the poor then "eliminating poverty and the poor through growth becomes the key to saving the environment." (Broad, 1994:812) This contention is highly inconsistent with the reality of the rapid economic growth and the accompanying increase in inequity and poverty being experienced by Thailand today.

B. The Political Economy Perspective

There are three main areas in which the wisdom of the conventional paradigm is questioned by researchers who have begun to break down this traditionally accepted view. The first point is the key question : "why are the poor poor?" (Broad, 1994:812) This puts the focus correctly on the causes of poverty and takes it of f the poor themselves. A second point that is being made by researchers is that some poor people act "not as environmental degraders, but as environmental sustainers" (Broad, 1994:812) The third contribution of this perspective is to document that the poor are not victims of the downward spiral nor are they only sustainers but they are "positive actors" as participants in grassroots ecology movements. (Broad, 1994:813) These points have high relevance for the context of Northeast Thailand.

C. The Northeast Thailand Context

Turton has stated that it is the policies of government which have been largely responsible for the inequities in the Northeast. He notes, "the net social and economic consequences of policies have been to maintain or create massive regional disparities, notably affecting the Northeast." (Turton, 1989:64) He states that government policies, or lack of them, in the agricultural sector have led to "increased inequalities of income and unequal access to means of production, access to employment and indeed access to virtually all social benefits." (Turton, 1989: 65) He feels that there will be no change in the policies of the government and that they will continue to favor and benefit farmers with middle and higher incomes during the next decade.

Lohmann states that in the past three decades, the rural poor have been forced into a position of "land deprivation" by at least four causes which are related to the patterns of economic development promoted by the Thai state and its international benefactors. First, he notes, "is economic differentiation, the accumulation of land and other resources in the hands of a minority, and the migration of the deprived seeking new access to them." Second, "this pressure is subject to positive feedback from environmental degradation resulting from the cultivation of migrant-cleared upland forests, and from cultural change undermining previous protective attitudes toward local land and forest." Third, "outright seizure or enclosure of land by elites for ‘economically productive’ purposes such as logging or plantations forces still more peasants into forest colonization." Finally, "rising land prices and speculation make it difficult even for those smallholders who have kept control of their fields to resist pressures to sell and move on elsewhere." (Lohmann, 1993: 183)

The point is that it is the process of development and economic growth in Thailand which has marginalized the villagers of Northeast Thailand and has pushed and pulled them into more and more inequity and poverty. Fields states that economic growth is almost always associated with a reduction in absolute poverty. But he notes that his study shows that "the decisive factor in determining whether inequality increases or decreases is not the rate of economic growth but rather the kind of growth." (Fields, 1989:177) In point of fact, it has been the unbalanced growth (urban, industrial, and elite biased growth) experienced by Thailand which has done much to create the inequities and the poverty experienced by the Northeast as well as the environmental degradation which continues to impact the region.

In light of the above the natural question would be to ask why the small farmers of the Northeast have not done more to improve their own situation or, put another way, why the Thai government has not been obliged to give greater political priority to improving the position of the rural poor. Turton notes that there are several reasons for the absence of any active efforts on the part of the rural poor to better their plight. He notes that there is in Thailand "a relatively high degree of religious, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity ..., the absence of popular anti-colonial or successful revolutionary struggles, the historical continuity of ruling institutions, and the degree of geographical and political coordination and centralization of the country." (Turton, 1989:66) Added to this is the "existence of laws which expressly forbid the formation of rural trade union type organizations as well as laws and authoritative practices which suppress forms of political organization and dissent." (Turton, 1989:66)

Although this is true, there seems to be a growing resistance to what Vandergeest and Peluso have called the "territorialization" of state power, especially in the Northeast. Clashes between the military and peasants in the Northeast have been occurring since the late 1980s (FEER, 31 October, 1991; FEER, 17 March,1994) But as Vandergeest and Peluso note, "far from abandoning territorialization, however, the state has repeatedly responded to peasant activities through an intensification of territorial strategies of control." (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995: 416) The government is supported in this activity by international aid and legitimation as well as by the "increased global involvement in national-level environmental protection." (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995:416)

IV. Future Directions

Pressures for new approaches to land and forest rights in Thailand are growing rapidly today. There is a virtual battle being fought by "grassroots" groups in local areas to ward of f the control of land and forest rights by the state and commercial interests. In 1989 villagers coming from provinces across the Northeast capped two years of protests be asking the government to stop the expansion of commercial plantations and to accept that forest conservation and land rights for people go hand in hand. They also asked that the government enact a "community forest" law which would recognize the existing role of ordinary people in forest conservation. They also requested documentation of villagers’ claims to farmland and communities claims to local woodlands in National Reserve Forests (NRFs). (Lohmann, 1993)

In 1990, 19 NGOs which were working with farmer’s groups presented the government with a 10 point proposal which followed up on the requests at the 1989 meeting. The focus of the proposal was that the government shift its emphasis from "law enforcement" in the NRFs to local participation in forest management. The proposal also called for surveys of 276 forests formerly leased to logging companies. Shortly after this a group of some 200 NGOs working in rural development called for a moratorium on Finnish funding for a Forestry Master Plan which would give privileged treatment to corporations that wanted to lease forest areas. In February, 1991, the NGOs forced the Finnish contractor to agree to suspend work until grassroots communities had more say in national forestry policy. (Lohmann, 1993)

Just prior to the military coup of February, 1991, the same NGO group presented the government with another proposal calling for economic justice in plans being formulated for the NRFs. The 1991 military coup saw the institutionalization of the khor jor kor project, incomprehensibly called the "Project for Agricultural Land Distribution to Poor People Living in Degraded Forest". The goal of the project was to move 1.25 million settlers off NRF land and squeeze them together with at least another 2 million occupants of an area of 5 million rai (one rai = 1600 square meters) of the -Northeast’s denuded forest. (FEER, 31 October, 1991:15,16) (Lohmann, 1993) May, 1992, however, saw an uprising of the growing middle class in Thailand in a successful attempt to overthrow the military coup of 1991. A civilian government was established as a result. (Lohmann, 1993)

Following some major demonstrations by Northeastern villagers, which included the blockade of the main north-south road in the Northeast, the new government decided that commercial interests would be removed from so called "reforestation". The khor jor kor project was replaced by a new land and forest management scheme which places emphasis on community forest rights. (Lohmann, 1993)

With a civilian government currently in control in Thailand the potential for dealing with the "biased" policies of the past looks good. Most observers, however, agree that what is needed is a system of land management which is "collaborative, bottom-up, sensitive to the multiplicity of local knowledge and needs and more reliant on village and local level institutions" rather than central government control. (Lohmann, 1993:190)

Villagers and NGOs, on the other hand are asking for specifics such as the primacy of land rights for the small farmer and planning which begins in small farmers’ own organizations as well as the assurance that there will be no more military intervention in the NRFs. There are many disagreements and uncertainties concerning the process which the new approaches should take, but given the "reverse" pressures being exerted today by "grass-roots" organizations and farmers along with the support of the growing NGO community (at last count over 10,000 NGO groups existed in Thailand, most established by members of the growing Thai middle class) and many concerned Thai academics, there "seems" to be "hope" for the future of the marginalized poor in the Northeast.

What the "grass-roots" groups, the NGOs and the academics offer, is something new for Thai Society: an approach which deals with the problem of poverty and marginalization from a "particularistic" (contextualized) perspective which gives credibility to those at the bottom of the Thai social structure. This is a radical change from the normal Thai "universalistic" (centralized) perspective which gives power credit and advantage to those at the top of the hierarchy of society.

As many analysts of Thai society have noted (Rigg, 1991) (Turton, 1989) (Jacobs, 1971) (Christensen, 1993) (Juree, 1989), the "patrimonial" nature of the Thai social system acts as a major obstacle to the process of equitable development and growth in the country. What remains to be seen is if the "counter cultural" forces being activated by the "grass-roots" groups, NGOs, and academics can create a power base stable enough to counter not only conflicting state and commercial interests but also the strong hierarchical nature of Thai society itself.

As has been mentioned above, what is needed today is not only a land management system but a system of development which is "collaborative, bottom-up, sensitive to the multiplicity of local knowledge and needs and more reliant on village and local level institutions". (Lohmann, 1993:190) This will not happen unless there is a major shift in the social structure and behavior patterns of Thai society from the present hierarchical orientation to a more egalitarian view. If the new "counter cultural" forces which are at work in Thai society today can begin to influence such a shift, there will be "real" hope for all marginalized people in Thailand.

Ayal, Eliezer B., "Thailand’s Development: the Role of Bangkok," In Pacific Affairs, 65 (3), 353-367, Fall 1992.

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