Early Development of the Korat Plateau
Growing Primacy of Bangkok
Underdevelopment of the Korat Plateau
Results of the Underdevelopment
Current Directions in Urban/Rural Relations
I. Introduction
Over the past 40 years, Thailand has been transformed from one of the poorest countries in the world (in 1950 Thailand had completed a century of zero per capita output growth) into one of the world’s fastest growing economies today (with an average growth rate of 8% over the past decade). Thailand is currently referred to as one of Asia’s "New Little Dragons" and is on the verge of joining the exclusive club of N.E. Asian NICs (newly industrialized countries). (Warr, 1993, 1)
Due largely to the rapid economic growth which Thailand has experienced over the past several decades, it is thought that the incidence of poverty in the country has generally declined. When the upward adjustment of the standard of living in the nation is taken into account, however, the poverty level in Thailand at best today is no better than it was 20 years ago. At worst, the poverty level has increased. (see Appendix #2) The increase in the per cent of the Northeast Thai population living below the poverty live has actually increased from 35.93% in 1981 to 67.10% in 1988. (Medhi, 1992, 225)
Although some might debate the fact that absolute poverty in Thailand has increased over the past two decades, there is no doubt that relative poverty or income inequality has actually increased. According to the 1989 analysis by the National Statistics Office, the top 10% of the population had an increase in their income share from 33% in 1975 to 37.85% in 1989. The bottom 10% of the population decreased substantially from 2.43% in 1975 to 1.76% in 1989. (Teerana, 1990, 166-167) (see Appendix #3) The high distortion of income distribution as it affects N.E. Thailand can be seen clearly by the fact that "whereas the Bangkok Metropolitan Region contains 15.8% of the population in 1988, per capita GDP in Bangkok was 9 times higher than that for the Northeast", which accounts for over 33 % of the total Thai population. (Chalongphob, 1992, 30) (see Appendix #4)
It seems that "seven years of breakneck economic development have created two Thailands: an affluent and industrialized capital city and an impoverished agricultural hinterland." (FEER, April 14, 1994, 22)
The underdevelopment of the Northeast hinterland is generally seen to be the direct result of a degraded environment (poor soils, capricious weather and irregular distribution of water resources). The impact of a degraded environment on the development of the Northeast is undeniable, but it is a partial and a not sufficient reason for the underdevelopment of the Korat Plateau. As Donner has noted, although "planners have generally attributed the reasons for the underdevelopment (of the N.E.) to geography..., it seems that history should also be the focus of attention in studying the backwardness of the North-East." (Donner, 1978, 547)
It is the position of this paper that not just history in general, but a number of specific historical variables have led to the underdevelopment of Northeast Thailand over time. It is the history of the interaction of the Korat Plateau, as the area is commonly known, first with Laos and then Bangkok which provides us with clues to why the Northeast periphery remains largely underdeveloped to this day. The historical variables which have had a critical impact on the Northeast over time and have contributed to its underdevelopment are social, economic and ethnic as well as environmental in nature.
II. The Early Development of the Korat Plateau
A. Ethnic Makeup
For several centuries before the end of the 13th century, the Korat Plateau had been in the Angkor Empire and its population was predominately Khmer. The early part of the 13th century, however, saw the establishment of Sukhothai, the first important autonomous Thai state in an area formerly dominated by Mons and Khmers (north central Thailand). The second king of Sukhothai, Ramkhamhaeng, a great warrior king, extended the control of Sukhothai over most of central and western Thailand as well as the northern part of what is now Northeast Thailand.(Wyatt, 1982, 56)
In the mid 14th century, the Lao kingdom of Lan Chang (at Luang Prabang) and the Siamese kingdom of Ayutthaya (in the heart of central Thailand) were established. Although Ayutthaya was theoretically successor to Sukhothai’s control over the northern part of Northeast Thailand it abandoned its claim in the face of pressure from the new Lan Chang kingdom and focused on consolidating control over central and eastern Thailand. (Keyes, 1967, 6)
The first record of a sizable migration of Lao to the Northeast came with the order of Fa Ngum, leader of the Lan Chang kingdom, in the mid 14th century to resettle 20,000 Lao families around Vientiane and the northern part of the Northeastern Plateau. (Maha Sila Viravong, 1964, 34) From that time until the 17th century there is little mention of what took place in the Northeast Plateau. What is known, however, is that the plateau formed a buffer zone between the Lao and Siamese kingdoms often becoming a battleground due to its intermediate position. (Maha Sila Viravong, 1964, 50-51)
Although the Northeast Plateau was incorporated into neither the Lao or the Siamese kingdoms prior to the 17th century, it was becoming increasingly Lao in its ethnic tradition. The movement of Lao people begun in the mid 14th century continued over this time. The Plateau also seems to have become a haven for the politically dispossessed of Laos. During the last decades of the 16th century, large numbers of Lao around Vientiane (established in 1563) migrated to an area extending from Roi-Et to Campasak in an attempt to escape the rule of a usurper who had come to the throne of the Lan Chang Kingdom (Maha Sila Viravong, 1964, 69-70). In addition to this, a history of Kalasin province in Northeast Thailand reports the steady migration of Lao people into the area from 1050-1750 as well as a large migration of political dissidents from Vientiane the latter part of the 18th century. (Keyes, 1967, 8)
The influx of the Lao did not result in the supplanting of the pre-existent Khmer culture with a Lao culture. Rather, from the time of Fa Ngum on the Lao borrowed many important elements from the Khmer "great tradition". But culturally, the Plateau was becoming increasingly Lao as the migration of Lao people from the left side of the Mekhong continued. (Keyes, 1967, 8,9)
In 1767 Ayutthaya was destroyed by the Burmese and consequent Siamese capitals were established at Thonburi and later at Bangkok. During this period of transition wars broke out between the Lao and the Siamese as well. In 1827, King Rama III of the Chakkri Dynasty of Thailand laid siege to Vientiane and totally destroyed it. In the aftermath, part of the populace of Vientiane was moved to the Northeast Plateau and another part to the central Thai provinces. At this time the towns on the Northeast Plateau which had formerly been under the control of Vientiane were placed under the supervision of the Interior Ministry of Bangkok. (Breazeale, 1994, 34,35)
For more than a decade starting in 1834 the Thai made a sustained effort to move all of the Lao population on the left side of the Mekhong to the Northeast Plateau and parts of central Thailand. The purpose was to create a buffer zone between Thailand and Vietnam during the Thai-Vietnamese war (1834-1847). It is estimated that some 80,000 Lao were initially removed from Vientiane in 1827 and that the total resettlement numbers might have been several hundred thousand people. (Breazeale, 1994, 38,39)
Thus the Northeast Plateau became predominantly Lao in its ethnic make-up. As Keyes notes, "in consequence of migrations and assimilation, the vast majority of the northeastern populace is today closely related culturally to the Lao on the opposite bank of the Mekhong. Although there are slight cultural variations in the region due to a long period of local autonomy and the greater impact of Khmer culture upon the people of the Northeast ... in the main the people of the Northeast can be grouped ethnically with the Lao as differentiated from the Siamese or Central Thai." (Keyes, 1967, 12) (see Appendix #5)
B. Economic Production
During the early development period of the Northeast Plateau, before the impact of Bangkok and the West, the populace focused mainly on a subsistence economy. As Seri notes, "as land was divided or occupied, a family would usually only work a piece of land which was considered to be sufficient for family consumption." (Seri, 1990, 14)
There was little pressure to produce surplus and life revolved mainly around production for family and community consumption. As Fuller states, "farming was organized mainly within family units, with no sign of the emergence of a landlord class. Surpluses produced for cash tended to be small in scale and intermittent. The glutinous rice traditionally in the Northeast ... were not in demand for the export market." (Fuller, 1983, 25)
In a study done on the production and consumption of cloth and fabric in Northern Thailand in the 19th century, Anthropologist Katherine Bowie notes that although the weaving of cloth was an important activity in Northern Thailand in the 19th century, "contrary to what is commonly assumed, weaving was not a universal household industry, only certain villagers in certain villages wove" (Bowie, 1993, 147)
Bowie also notes that "the ruling lords were able to extract raw cotton, woven cloth and dyestuffs as tribute... (which) provided the aristocracy with a quantity of cotton cloth no single producer could hope to match." (Bowie, 1993, 148) Bowie further notes that "it is also possible that royalty were involved in the cotton trade. There was considerable demand for cotton cloth from Burma." The fact was that trade by the elites was possible "because they could extract tribute and slave labor (and so) found it much easier to acquire cloth than did the commoners." (Bowie, 1993, 149)
It should be noted that the area of Northern Thailand which Bowie describes (the Chiangmai valley) was at that time part of the Northern Thai state of Lan Na, a tributary of Bangkok, and was easily interacted with by the aristocracy of the state. Northeast Thailand, however, was in a sense an "enclave" which was far removed from Bangkok and in large measure ignored by both Bangkok and Laos. The interaction of the aristocracy with the Northeast would have been difficult at best. In addition to the physical obstacles were the social inhibitors. The inhabitants of the Northeast in the early days were either political dissidents from Laos or war captives who were forcefully resettled in the Korat Plateau by the conquering Siamese in the early 19th century. It seems likely, as a result, that what trade there was, if any, in the Northeast at that time was of a narrowly focused and internal nature.
It would seem, however, that the general pattern of production was agricultural and was for subsistence use. This pattern of subsistence production basically continued throughout the Northeast until the early part of the 1960s and in fact continues in many parts of the Plateau until the present time.
C. Social System
In the Northeast, the corporate village acted as the social unit which was highly insular and was integrated through institutions which stressed reciprocity and which facilitated redistribution throughout the community. As Douglass notes, "the apex of social relations of the peasantry... was neither the clan, caste or class but the corporate village". (Douglass, 1984, 32)
Villages were established spontaneously as the need arose. As Philips has stated, "in Northeast Thailand, an egalitarian village structure has traditionally precluded acquisition of new land from poorer neighbors. This has meant that migration for clearance of forest land is the only alternative … and new villages have traditionally been established 3-5 kilometers away from the original village." (Hirsch, 1990, 34)
Leadership of the village was based on a "natural leader" system which had at its core a "chao kote" (an elder) who was respected by the entire village. Moral integrity was the main criteria for the position. The elder was to give advice, preside over ceremonies, solve conflicts and quarrels and generally give stability to the village. The decision of the elder was final and there would seldom be further discussion. (Seri, 1990, 18)
As Scott points out, however, this ideal did not produce an egalitarian utopia. Social strife and conflicts existed and some of the forms of imposing moral sanctions (gossip or ostracism) were restrictive of personal freedom. (Scott, 1976, 4) Yet with the values of reciprocal and redistributive exchange acting as critical ingredients of the social, political and economic relations of the villagers, no one could fall below subsistence level while others prospered through the accumulation of surpluses. (Douglass, 1984, 34)
Reciprocal exchange, however, occurred asymmetrically between members of unequal status, or between junior-senior relations. This informal patron/client system offered an all embracing relationship in exchange for the performance of tasks and labor service on the part of the client. As Hanks has put it, the patron/client system can de defined as an "entourage" or a group focused on a single person who was their patron. The entourage was individualistic in nature with its focus on a particular patron who was the source of stability for the group. (Hanks, 1975, 200)
It should be noted here that the relation between peasants and those upon whom they are dependent became the focus of much scholarly attention following the publishing of James C. Scott’s The Moral Economy of the Peasant in 1976. Scott argued that the radices of pre-colonial village society were the collective solutions to the problem of survival. According to Scott, the most important of these were guarantees extended by patrons to those dependent on them. (Scott, 1976) Samuel Popkin, however, in The Rational Peasant: Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam which was published in 1979, questioned Scott’s thesis and proposed that peasants in pre-colonial societies in seeking to guarantee subsistence had actually relied far more on individual activity than on collective village resources. (Popkin, 1979)
As the debate escalated, its apex was reached in the publication of a symposium in the "Journal of Asian Studies" in 1983 entitled, "Peasant Strategies in Asian Societies: Moral and Rational Economic Approaches - a Symposium" (Journal of Asian Studies, 1983)
One of the key contributors to the symposium, Charles F. Keyes, notes in his introduction to the volume that "Scott’s theory, based on the fundamental assumption that peasants everywhere are impelled to maximize subsistence and avoid risk, is not adequate to deal with the range of economic behavior to be found in most Asian peasant communities." (Keyes, 1983, pg.757) More specifically, however, Keyes who, as an Anthropologist, has done most of his research in Northeast Thailand asserts in his article "Economic Action and Buddhist Morality in a Thai Village" which is part of the Symposium that his basic problem with Scott is that Scott’s "approach is predicated on an assumption that peasant values are everywhere the same because peasantry are constrained to act within the same type of political economy." (Keyes, 1983, 865)
In spite of his disagreement with Scott’s assumption, however, Keyes finds that Scott’s conclusions are consistent with the context of Northeast Thailand. As he notes, "Northeastern villagers confront the constraints on their economic life that derive from subordination as an ethnoregional minority to a highly centralized state not as members of autonomous households, but as members of villages. These villages are ... worlds that shape a distinctive "moral economy" of the Thai-Lao peasantry" (Keyes, 1983, 855) Keyes goes on to say that the difference between his interpretation of a "moral economy" and that of Scott is one of source. Scott derives the idea of a "moral economy" "from an a priori model of universalized ‘peasant’ community", whereas for Keyes the "moral economy" is specific to the Northeast and "is grounded in a Buddhist worldview " which underlies the culture of Northeast Thailand for Keyes. As he notes in his conclusion, "the Buddhist villages of Northeast Thailand have a distinctive economic ethic and, thus, a distinctive moral economy not because they are peasants, but because they are Buddhists who are also peasants." (Keyes, 1983, 865)
It therefore appears that, for the Buddhist villagers of Northeast Thailand, although in one sense life was hard, it was good since the bond of community tended to ease individual burdens by placing them on the corporate body. When labor was in short demand, such as during harvest times, the farmers would organize a harvest group known as a "loong khek" consisting of fellow farmers. The contributed labor was not paid for and sometimes not even reciprocated. A feast of thanksgiving given by the owner was considered reward enough. (Ng, 1978, 40)
D. Physical Environment
The inherent physical environment of the 180,000 square kilometers that constitute the Korat Plateau is a harsh one. It is bound on the west by the Petchabon Range which is 300 meters in height and on the south by the Dong Rek mountains of the same size. Both ranges have steep scarps which separate them from the main streams of development which took place in Central Thailand. The surface of the plateau averages 200 meters above sea-level and is sloped toward the Mekhong to the north and east. This slope is interrupted only by the Phu Phan range which lies parallel to the middle course of the Mekhong and marks the drainage basins of the Nam Chi and Nam Mun rivers, two major tributaries of the Mekhong. ( Ng, 1978, 37) (see Appendix #6)
By nature, the rivers of the Plateau have two basic characteristics which make them ineffective resources for agriculture. First, they have few tributaries, leaving large areas of land beyond the reach of water resources. Second, the rivers tend to dig deep into the sandstone structures that underlie the region making access to water difficult.
In the early days of the development of the Plateau, forests covered a large portion of the region. Seri notes that by 1937 forests still covered 60% of the Plateau. This made settlement difficult and also resulted in soils which had inherent low fertility. (Seri, 1990, 5)
The Plateau lies further from the coast-line of mainline Southeast Asia than any other part of the region and is the area with the lowest precipitation. The average rainfall which falls over a period of 125 days between June and October is from l200mm - 2300mm depending on the year and location. (Ng, 1978, 38)
In spite of the difficulty of a hostile environment, the migrants to the Northeast adapted to the context and built communities which were assured of survival due to the agricultural skills they brought with them as well as the social organizations they built and the cultural customs they practiced. In 1978 Ng wrote that "the sensible agricultural practices, ...the functional utility of family organization and inheritance are all extremely meaningful in the context of the Northeast. ... a more than ten-fold increase in population has taken place in the past hundred years without straining the meager land resources and without any obvious signs of a declining living standard. The increase in agricultural area has always kept pace with...the rate of population growth. A harmonious relationship between man and land has always been maintained, even with the environmental difficulties and unpredictabilities." (Ng, 1978, 43,44)
It was not but a few short years later (early 1980s) that the surplus of agricultural land in the Northeast ran out. The impact of the loss of the availability of this factor of production as well as the impact of the demands of a rapidly growing Bangkok were to have a radical impact on the future of the Northeast.
III. The Growing Primacy of Bangkok
A. Bangkok the Primate Thai City
As Romm has noted, "Metropolitan Bangkok is one of the most dominant primate cities in the world. Its dominance increases as national development proceeds." (Romm, 1973, 7) In 1983 Fuller stated that Bangkok with a population of 4,999,515 was 51 times the size of the second most populous city of Thailand, Chiangmai. (Fuller, 1983, 32) The growth of Bangkok in relation to the rest of Thailand can best be seen in its contrast with the lack of urban growth in the Northeast. As Donner states, "the Northeast has remained a rural area with municipalities playing no important part. Though there are a number of towns with long histories, ... the number of people living in them out of the total population of the region developed only from 2.4% (1947) to 3.7% (1970) (Donner, 1978, 585) (see Appendix #7)
commenting on urban and economic trends in Southeast Asia, Pernia states that, "Thailand’s low national urbanization level is in stark contrast to its high urban primacy. This primacy has been nurtured by. the concentration of economic activity in the metropolis- a consequence of urban-biased development policy." (Pernia, 1991, 119) (see Appendix #8)
The focus of Thailand on "Bangkok-based development" has had a number of important consequences related- to the development of inequity between the core and the periphery. As Christensen, a political economist in Bangkok notes, "Over the past three decades, adjustments to the institutions of national decision making have strengthened the central government’s control over the provinces and boosted the role of urban industrialists in the policy-making process. While gradually improving the state’s policy management capacities, these adjustments have had pernicious distributional consequences as well. They have centered most of the industrial growth in and around Bangkok; served the political interests of the capital’s bureaucratic elite; and assigned urban industrialists a privileged status in policy making."(Christensen, 1992, iii)
In large measure, the regional imbalances experienced in Thailand today, are the result of a rapid economic growth which from the start has been centered on Bangkok. There are two basic factors which have led to this situation. One is the impact of Western colonialism on Bangkok and the resulting development process. The second is the influence of the Thai social system on the development of Bangkok and its extension into the periphery.
B. The Impact of Western colonialism
Many of the modern processes of increased economic growth and increased social and economic differentiation in Thailand had their beginnings in 1855. During that year Thailand signed a treaty with the British opening the country to international trade. Since the signing of the Bowring Treaty with Britain, "processes of economic growth and change and associated administrative reforms have more or less continually reinforced the power of Bangkok and the Central Region relative to the rest of Thailand." (Fuller, 1983, 24)
It should be noted that although Thailand was technically never colonized by the West during this intensive colonization period it was due largely to the countries ability to anticipate the needs of the colonialists and meet them. Within years of signing the treaty with Britain, Thailand had signed treaties with a number of powers in an attempt to maintain its political independence. Although successful in the area of political control, Thailand was opened to exploitation by the capitalist economic system. Concurrently and, for our purposes more importantly, an impact was made on the Thai indigenous social and economic structures, especially those of the periphery. (Elliot, 1978, 23, 24)
The impact of the colonial system on the economic and social systems of Thailand was radical. (Fallon, 1983, 4) Resources were changed from production for use to production for exchange by the imputation of exchange values for land, labor and natural resources. Usufruct rights to land that were as old as the nation itself were transformed into rights of private ownership which was legitimized by the colonial biased state. A natural result was the divesting of small producers of their land by transfer to non-producers (with power and money). (Douglass, 1984, 8)
The replacement of the traditional Thai state by a state transformed by reforms promoted by colonial powers accelerated the dissolution of local formations in the nation by the loosely-integrated kingdom into a well defined nation-state. In the process, the Lao of the Korat Plateau who had always been seen as "the other" by the Bangkok elite, were incorporated into a part of "the self" and became Thai. From 1900 on non-Thai ethnic groups seemingly disappeared from Thailand. In response to the pressure of the colonial powers, the Bangkok Thai, in a strange "reverse orientalism" erased the Lao - ethnically, historically and demographically- from. Thailand. (Strekfuss, 1993, 142) As Thongchai says, "the emergence of the geo-body of Siam was not a gradual evolution from the indigenous political space to a modern one. It was a displacement of the former by the latter at various moments both by foreign powers and by the Siamese themselves." (Thongchai, 1994, 131)
It should be noted that the response of the Bangkok elite to the influence of the colonial powers was one of accommodation. The colonial system was not an entirely new idea. The Thai had just recently sacked the Lao city of Vientiane in 1827 and brought as much of the Lao population and its wealth as possible into the immediate control of the Bangkok government in an effort to enhance the productive capacity of the core area of the Thai state. Since the signing of the Bowring Treaty the economic growth and power of the Thai core elite has grown relative to the rest of the country and today this is one of key obstacles to the effective equitable distribution of the gains from growth to the rest of the country including the Korat Plateau.
C. The Influence of the Thai Social System
It would be a misjudgment to conclude that the growing problems of poverty and inequity in the Thai economy today are the result solely of the impact of the Western colonial system on the country. There is no doubt that the impact was substantial and that it contributed greatly to the underdevelopment of the nation, especially in the peripheral regions. There is also no doubt that the nature of the Thai social system as well, contributed and still is contributing to the ongoing underdevelopment of the periphery.
Gohlert in his book, Power and Culture, notes that "aside from the obvious discrepancies between the rhetoric and the current level of true development in Thailand, there are other, equally troubling concerns that derive from the Thai social context. Given the pervasiveness and deep roots of particular values and related behavior patterns, for example, the patron/client system, the presumed inability to cooperate horizontally, distrust in personal relations ... (the question is) what are the implications for future development?" (Gohlert, 1991, 23, 24)
Thai society is basically autocratic in nature. At its best it is benevolent and not absolute or despotic, but it is autocratic. (Gohlert, 1991, 76) Norman Jacobs in Modernization without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study, makes a convincing case for the centrality of Thai patrimonialism in the social behavior of Thai society. Jacob’s thesis -is that Thai patrimonialism is responsible for Thailand’s "modernization" -without "development". (Jacobs, 1971, 9) Jacobs is joined by Jonathan Rigg in a recent article "Grass-Roots Development in Rural Thailand: a Lost Cause?" who claims that the hierarchical and paternalistic patron/client system which is at the core of the operations of Thai bureaucracy as well as Thai society in general, is the basic inhibitor to the success of grass roots development in Thailand. (Rigg, 1991, 206, 207) Christensen notes, "Corruption...is one of the core elements of the system of patronage which continues to pervade the institutions of the central hiereaucracy. Its persistence (is) testimony to a conspicuous absence of accountability in the Thai body politic." (Christensen, 1993,8)
It is the position of this paper that the arguments of Jacobs, Christensen and Rigg are consistent with the twenty plus years of experience which the author has had in rural development in Northeast Thailand (with the Issaan Development Foundation 1973-1994). Jacob’s development of the patrimonial nature of Thai society and its relationship to development, especially that of the -periphery, can be summarized in five stages.
1. The Nature of the Patrimonial System (Jacobs, 1971, 27-30) · Thai patrimonialism is paternalistic, which means that its rulers are viewed as fathers. The strongest example of this is the king who is the "father" of his people. Another example is the village leader who is seen as the "father" of the villagers. · Thai patrimonialism is benevolent. The patron ideally must be compassionate and understanding to those below him. · Thai patrimonialism is autocratic, although it is ideally neither despotic nor absolute. Having said this, it must be noted that arbitrary decision making by superiors is not only accepted in Thai society but is also expected. · Thai patrimonial decision making is "unitary" and "autonomous" rather than differentiated or dispersed. Subordinates are given little if any power. · Thai patrimonial leadership defines its own political role in society and disregards any counterdefinitions. It demands that its political decisions be accepted even if it means sacrifice on the part of outsiders or cliental subordinates. In short, productive political action is seen to be synonymous with "elite innovation".
2. The Application of the Patrimonial System to Periphery Authority (Jacobs, 1971, 55-58)
· First, the structure is urban dominated. As far back as the Sukhothai period, provincial government was equivalent to town government. This means that towns have not only dominated the rural hinterland but that towns have served primarily as the centers for the patrimonial administration and fiscal exploitation of the countryside rather than as cultural or commercial centers.
· The second application is that the capital (Bangkok) dominates the periphery through the urban orbit.
· A third- application is that there is an absence a decentralizing principle in peripheral-political decision making. What in Thailand is often called decentralized government in the periphery is actually peripheral authority subordinated completely to the direction and interest of the core (Bangkok). As has been noted already, the modernization of the forms of administration in Thailand since 1855 have enabled the core to more effectively realize its longstanding desire to for more effective control of the periphery.
3. The Implications of the System for Effective Performance (Jacobs, 1971, 82-87)
· This kind of administrative system places primary emphasis on patronal decision-maker’s ability to manipulate human relationships and encourage personal obligation as the main means of managing an organization.
· The degree of coordination and cooperation in the system is not due to formal rules or administrative imperatives but rather is due to the particular patrimonial desires of the few patronal decision-makers in the system.
· Administrators, those who control and manipulate people, dominate over technicians and those who control the environment.
· Regardless of how coherent the formal system looks on paper (usually the result of the modernizing efforts of expatriate administrative experts) operationally, few areas of objectivity exist in the system and there are few or no incentives to increase them. In fact, objectivity may well run counter to patrimonial goals.
· A large amount of permissiveness exists for following or not following performance rules. Formal rules are generally taken with a grain of salt. Orders are generally given on a one-shot basis and there is normally little or no follow-up it insure compliance.
· In this system it is commission and not omission which will lead a subordinate into difficulty with his patronal superior. As a result the most appropriate action is to avoid decision making or firm commitment to performance of any kind.
· There are no regularized or predicable standards or incentives for performance in the Thai administrative system. Performance is as predictable and as standard as the specific and individual personal relationships of individuals involved in the system.
4. Social Behavior Patterns Appropriate within the System (Jacobs, 1971, 91-95)
· Formal conformity to the existing environment in the hope that this will persuade patronal superiors to distribute prebends or at least dissuade them from inflicting cliental impositions. Formal conformity basically means the avoidance of all confrontations which might lead to conflict with others. The ideal conformist is the "good person" (phu dii) who is a person, out of necessity, of shallow interpersonal relations.
· Interpersonal relations which are preferred are those that spell out the specific commitments of all parties. The validity of the commitments are dependent on reciprocity rather than long range interpersonal relations dependent on trust and open commitments. One must be distrustful of anyone, even relatives, who offer something for nothing.
· Rather than attack the social system directly, one is expected to circumvent it and to take advantage of all opportunities.
· It is preferable to escape from situations which are likely to give rise to firm commitment or confrontation. Unavoidable interpersonal relations are selected on the basis of what reciprocal demands they place on one. Relations with a patron who will demand only ritual conformity in return for prebends is preferable.
· Finally, in spite of all social and cultural inhibitions to the contrary, there are times when the only way out of conflicts is through violence against society or others.
5. The Thai patrimonial system and development decisions. (Jacobs, 1971, 130-133)
· Priorities in the allocation of scarce economic resources are determined more by patrimonial considerations than by pragmatic economic concerns.
· Planning for development is used by the political authority primarily as means to better serve rather than question if not alter its patrimonial interests.
· The allocation of economic sacrifice and benefit connected with development is spread unevenly among society’s various -sectors or interests. This is a major reason for the problem of income disparity and regional imbalance.
· The allocation of resources between public and private sectors is determined on the basis of patrimonial goals (commonly called "national interest") which allows the patron to provide prebends and service without question.
· Finally, any economic problems which arise are assumed to have non-economic roots. Generally this means attributing the problems to counter-patrimonial actions.
The influence of the Thai social system outlined above is clearly operative in the results of a study done by Bruce London entitled, "Rural-Urban Hierarchy and National Development: The Role of Elites in the Distribution of Scarce Resources to the Thai Hinterland". London’s findings "point to the existence of both central and provincial elites which use their influence to shape the flow of resources in ways that both serve their immediate self interests and maintain social control." (London, 1986, 557)
Even more specifically, London found that (1) the presence of elites is associated with the disproportionate distribution of scarcer and more desirable resources; and (2) threats to elites were associated with the distribution of resources used for social control and legitimation. London’s conclusion is that "while demographic and economic factors are important determinants of resource distribution in Thailand, a full understanding of this process requires a careful consideration of the roles and interests of elites." (London, 1986, 557)
D. Thailand -- Is It Bangkok?
In a study entitled "Thailand’s Development: the Role of Bangkok", Eliezer Ayal concludes that modern development is dependent on urbanization in general and on a functionally modern city in particular. The development of smaller cities and the rest of the economy is contingent on "rays" or "pulses" which are transmitted from the-urban core to the periphery. He notes that in fact for -Thailand,. Bangkok is Thailand (the primal city) and that what is -needed is to facilitate and enhance the radiation of growth pulses from Bangkok to the rest of the country. He states that the spread of "urban norms" from the core is actually promoting the economic development of the country.(Ayal, 1992, 361, 366)
Another study done by the Faculty of Economics of Thammassat University in 1983 entitled Thailand - Is It Bangkok, comes to the opposite conclusion. (Thammassat, 1983) The focus of the volume is on the policy biases which have favored Bangkok over the rest of the country. The researchers hold that in most cases Bangkok benefited more from policy decisions both absolutely and in per capita terms than any other part of the country. The studies also hold that the economic growth of Bangkok has "no spread effect" to the rest of the economy but that Bangkok is an "absorptive" or even "parasitic" rather than a "generative" city. Ayal’s rejoinder is to say that "decisions made by those who hold power, whatever their motivations, have tremendously increased the size of Thailand’s national pie." (Ayal, 1992, 358-360)
It is the opinion of this paper that both Ayal and the Thammassat group are right. In fact, it would be hard to assert that resources do not flow from Bangkok to the periphery. The critical question, however, is "how" and to "whom" they flow. Ayal gives an example of resource flows from Bangkok to the Northeastern city of Khon Kaen which was selected to be the first "regional city" to be developed in Thailand. The attempt was to de-centralize and to build up the economy of this important Northeastern city. Ayal, however, notes that "it has had very little impact on the economy of the surrounding area; neither has it stopped the flow of migrants to Bangkok. In fact, Khon Kaen has high out-migration because of its urban development."(Ayal, 1992, 361)
Given the summary of the Thai social system above, it does not require much imagination to determine that the resources- invested in Khon Kaen were more than likely expended in a manner conducive to the patrimonial social system rather than the pragmatic economic needs of the city and periphery of Khon Kaen. If this is the case, then the Thammassat group is correct in assuming that Bangkok (and by extension the rural elites connected to Bangkok) is not a "generative" city. In short, the economic construct of "trickle down" of resources to the poor did not occur due to the social inhibitors of the patrimonial system.
IV. The Underdevelopment of the Korat Plateau
A. The Nature of Underdevelopment
Todaro, in his book Economic Development in the Third World, deals with the meaning of underdevelopment in one of his chapters and comes up with a highly appropriate definition of development which indicates the presence of underdevelopment by its absence. He lists three questions by which to determine if development has actually taken place. (Todaro, 1989, 91)
1) "Have general levels of living within a nation risen to the point that there has been a lessening of absolute poverty (i.e., deprivation of life-sustaining goods) and of inequality of income distribution, as well as improvements in levels of employment and the nature and quality of educational, health and other social and cultural services?"
2) "Has economic progress enhanced individual and group esteem both internally vis-à-vis one another and externally vis-à-vis other nations and regions?"
3) "Finally, has economic progress expanded the range of human choice and freed people from external dependence and internal servitude to other people and institutions, rather than merely substituting one form of dependence (e.g., economic) for another ( e.g., cultural)?"
Viewing the Korat Plateau from the viewpoint of Todaro’s three questions, it is a relatively simple matter to discount the first one. As mentioned at the start of this paper, the Northeast has a growing poverty incidence and income disparity level. It is the most underdeveloped area of Thailand in terms of Economic development. Points two and three deal more with the impact of both the economic and social systems on the Northeast and will be addressed below.
B. The Growth of Bangkok’s Control of the Northeast
With the opening of Thailand to the world economic system in the nineteenth century, the old reciprocal and redistributive exchange systems of traditional society began to change. The commercialization of the traditional economy meant "subordination of the substance of society to the laws of the market". (Douglass, 1984, 6)
It also meant the state (Bangkok) began to become actively involved in the periphery. In 1894, an official administrative reform of the Northeast was begun by the Bangkok center. The most important result of these reforms was the demotion and replacement of many of the existing local rulers (Chao) in the region. (Seri, 1990, 87). Thus the subordination of local political interests to the patrimonial interests of the core were experienced by the Northeasterners. There was an accompanying shift of the locus of all important political powers from the local "cities" (huamuang) to Bangkok. (Keyes, 1967, 17,18) (see Appendix #9)
The extension of Thai political control over the Northeast was accompanied by the creation of modern communication and transportation networks. At the same time, Bangkok began educational reforms which virtually took the role of education out of the hands of local Buddhist Monks where it had traditionally been and put it in the hands of the state. (Keyes, 1967, 19)
C. The Reaction of the Northeast
As Bangkok continued to assert its authority and control over the Northeast, the reaction of the Northeast to the penetration of Bangkok into every level of its society was resistance. A number of rebellions (eight historical uprisings which shook local powers and the power of core) against the state occurred from the beginning of the 18th century until past the middle of the 21st century. (Chatthip, 1984) Seri notes that the reasons for the rebellions was not only economic issues but "exploitation by the central government of local powers on the one hand and attacks on the social and cultural identity and local autonomy on the other " (Seri, 1990, 97)
Turton notes that three core issues in the rebellions seem to be:
1) A religious reaction to the situation of political power evidenced from the core to the periphery. "The concept of immediate and total liberation in a new era, and the miracle and secret lore which are seen as instruments to achieve it, are all forged in the cultural and moral struggle of oppressed peasants."
2) A social reaction against the changes in the existing patron/client system of the Northeast which were brought to bear on society by the establishment of new administrative systems in the Northeast by Bangkok.
3) An ethnic reaction against the "foreign" intrusion of the Siamese into a Lao periphery. (Turton, 1984, 86-89)
Horowitz, in his important work, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, notes that one of the important causes of ethnic conflict is "modernization". He states that "social mobilization" which is "an overall process of change which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life," is related to ethnic conflict as "it involves the substitution of new patterns of life for old.. .and other characteristics that break down commitments to traditional ways of living." (Horowitz, 1985, 99-101) He also notes that "theories that stress the relationship between ethnic conflict and modernization are quick to call attention to two important themes in ethnic conflict: the role of elite ambitions and the role of the differential modernization of ethnic groups in fostering conflict " (Horowitz, 1985, 101)
It is the position of this paper that the rebellions of the Northeast against the intrusion of the Bangkok government were the result of both the "modernization" impact of Bangkok on the periphery (the impact again of colonial powers) and the impact of the patrimonial social system of the Central Thai which had to compete with and ultimately replace the patron/client system which existed informally in the Northeastern traditional society.
It would seem that the last two points of Todaro’s definition of development were effectively undermined by the movement of the core into the periphery from the earliest days of its entry. In a real sense, the Northeast could more than likely be considered to have been a "developed region" (by Todaro’s definition) in the early days before the intrusion of Bangkok. Today, however, there is no possibility of claiming that the Korat Plateau is even close to fulfilling Todaro’s definition of development. The impact of both the colonial pressure for modernization and the Thai social system have resulted in a region which seems, even as it becomes more modernized, to become less developed day by day. As Jacobs has put it, the Northeast is experiencing "modernization without development." (Jacobs, 1971, 9)
V. The Results of the Underdevelopment of the Northeast
One of the major results of the underdevelopment of the Korat Plateau has been the increasing migration of the peoples of the Northeast to urban centers and especially to Bangkok. As was noted in the Far Eastern Economic Review, "development has been extremely unbalanced geographically in the kingdom. The concentration of economic activity in the greater Bangkok region draws millions of workers to the center from farms, except during the planting and harvest season. For most of the year, the Northeast, the poorest of the regions, is emptied of its able-bodied men and women and even the elder children, all gone off to the capital for work" (FEER, May 8, 1993, 46)
It is true that the migrants who leave the Northeast for work in the Bangkok region are in fact the "backbone" of the labor force in the countries manufacturing and service sectors. It is also true that in one sense, migration makes a valuable contribution to the economic welfare of households in the Northeast through funds sent home be the migrants. It is also true, however, that migration in no way produces sustainable development for the Northeast region as it depends heavily on conditions in Bangkok and the continued availability of opportunities there. The Northeastern people are perhaps at the apex of their dependence on the urban Metropolis when they migrate. (Parnwell, 1986, 135)
As has been noted, "the massive flows of workers to Bangkok are a symptom of what many consider Thailand’s most serious social problem: the growing income gap between the urban rich and the rural poor." (FEER, April 4, 1994, 22) Again, the impact of migration on the Northeast in no respector of age, as has been noted, "perhaps the worst hit by the growing rural-urban divide is the arid Northeast, the countries poorest region. Few villages are irrigated effectively, dry season unemployment is high and labor migration has become deeply entrenched. When children of Isan, as the .Northeast is known locally, reach their teens, armies of them must strike out on the road to seek work, often going overseas. During the dry season, villages empty as working age people flock to the capital and elsewhere leaving only the old and very young." (FEER, April, 14, 1994, 23)
One of the negative impacts of migration is the stress that it places on traditional family units in the Northeast. As has been noted, "labor migration has become a key fixture of the entire Thai economy...but such migration comes with a heavy price. The strain it places on Thailand’s traditional family structures is immense. Husbands and wives frequently can not stay together and their children are always raised by relatives in their home villages." (FEER, April 19, 1994, 23)
Another negative characteristic of migration is that its strong urban bias is destructive to the ongoing development of the rural area. As has been noted, "migration may be restricting the development potential of the local area, by removing some of the better educated and more innovated and receptive villagers. The surplus value of migrant labor, effectively lost by the village, helps to enhance profits and further investment in city establishments. Thus migration may be contributing to the very spatial inequalities which exert a strong influence over both the incidence and the directional characteristics of contemporary migration in Thailand." (Parnwell, 1986, 22)
An indirect impact of the underdevelopment of the Northeast is the rising incidence of child labor in Thailand. According to the World Bank, in 1975 about 45.8% of Thailand’s total population of 42 million at that time were under fifteen years of age.(World Bank, 1979) The number of children age 10-14 involved in child labor in Thailand rose from one million children in 1960 to 1.6 million in 1970. Although Thai law prohibits the employment of any child under 12, children of 10 - 12 years of age are often found working in registered factories. A study by the ministry of commerce in Thailand found that 3,000 factories were using child labor. According to Thai government officials there are at least 5,000 unregistered factories in Thailand that not only employ children under 12 years with impunity, but also ill treat them and make them work in inhumane conditions. (Sumanta, 1980, 7,13)
Increasing prostitution (including child prostitution) is another result of the growing underdevelopment of the Northeast. As has been noted, "it has been a dubious choice for poor farmers in Northeastern Thailand go deeper in debt for a few more years to round off your daughter’s education and retain some honor, or sell her into prostitution at an early age to get at least temporary financial relief." (FEER, April 14, 1994, 28) Entry into the occupation begins early in life for many girls in the Northeast, as is evidenced by the statement that, "for years many Thai farmers have been opting for "tok Khiew" a Thai phrase meaning "green harvest", or pledging green harvest to receive loans (in advance), but increasingly used to describe a promise to sell daughters as young as 12 or 13 into the city (Bangkok) flesh trade." (FEER, April 14, 1994, 28)
In sum, the impact of a rapidly growing Bangkok on its periphery, Northeast Thailand has done little if anything to enable its development in Todaro’s terms, either in the economic sense or the social sense. Further, the dominance of Bangkok and the pressure of the Thai social system have bound the Northeast up in dependence and servitude to the "core" more effectively today than at any other time in history.
VI. Current Directions in Urban/Rural Relations
The December 2-3, 1994 issue of "The Asian Wall Street Journal" noted that the current Thai government of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai has two basic goals to which it is committed. One is to apply the law equally to both the rich and the poor. The second is to spread the prosperity of Bangkok out to the rural areas. The basic means employed by the government to accomplish the second goal, is to give land to poor landless farmers. This was operationalized by a controversial cabinet resolution issued May 4, 1993. Members of the opposition parties are claiming that the government has opened the door wide "for capitalists to benefit from land reform". (Bangkok Post, December 1, 1994, pg.A4)
Both themes came back to haunt the Prime Minister this past week. In one application of the new land reform law in Phuket, it was found that ten wealthy families in the region had received 40% of the land provided by the new law due to influence (the patrimonial system). Both goals, the equality of the rich and poor before the law and the distribution of wealth to the poor were negated by the operation of the powerful social system of Thailand. The debate continues today. (The Asian Wall Street Journal, December 2-3, 1994, 1,24)
The need in Thailand today is for "growth with equity". This will demand structural as well as social changes in the country. There is currently an emphasis on de-centralization in the country, but given the strong social inhibitors to this process (as mentioned above), the outcome is by no means certain.
A growing community of NGO groups (both Thai and foreign) are focused on what they call their "comparative advantage" over the public sector in doing grass roots development. Gohlert has listed a number of the comparative advantages of the NGO community: (Gohlert, 1991, 55-67)
1) Focus is on the poor in society.
2) Method is participatory.
3) Goals are on "process" and not outcome (quantitative).
4) Focus is on people.
5) Flexibility and experimentation are central to the process.
6) Strengthening local private institutions is central.
7) Cutting costs of operations is central.
The NGO community, however, is subject to the same social inhibitions to development as the public sector. (Riggs, 1991, 205-207)
There is much to be said in support of the goals of both the NGO community and the Chuan government. If they can be actualized at the level of the rural poor, positive development will result. Time alone will tell if both groups have the political and the social will to go beyond rhetoric.
APPENDICES
At this time the appendices referenced in this article are not included. They are available on request to those who are interested.
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